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CATHOLIC SCHOOLS AND FREEDOM OF
CONSCIENCE IN THE CANADIAN CHARTER
OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
J. KENT DONLEVYt
INTRODUCTION
Democracies throughout the world seek to protect the
individual's conscience from state intrusion at least in so far as
the interior aspect of conscience is concerned and in part in its
exterior expression in society. However, the term conscience has
not normally been expressly defined either in common parlance
or juridically. Rather, colloquially it is seen as an unassailable
personal argument for an individual's action or inaction, solely
subjective in nature, being an interior personal ability to discern
right from wrong. Juridically, it is most frequently applied in
conjunction with principles of equity and freedom of religion.
This Paper asks a three part question: "How is freedom of
conscience employed juridically within the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, how is that usage different from the idea
of conscience in the Catholic Church and, of what significance is
that distinction to Canada's Catholic schools?"
This Paper is divided into three parts. Part I provides a brief
survey of Canadian case law that deals with freedom of
conscience. Part II provides an overview of the current
understanding of conscience in the Catholic Church as noted
through the documents of Vatican II and the writings of Germain
Grisez (1983), Bernard Hdring (1978), and Cardinal Ratzinger,
as he then was (1991). Part III articulates the administrative
and legal challenges facing Catholic school administrators when
confronted with non-conformist teachers and students who claim
t Dr. Donlevy (B.A., B.Ed., M.Ed., LL.B., Ph.D.) is a tenured associate
professor in the Faculty of Education, Graduate Division of Educational
Research, at the University of Calgary, Alberta, Canada. He is currently
completing his LL.M. at the University of London (U.K.).
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legitimacy for their positions under the "Restless-Heart-Toward-
God" model of conscience.
I. THE JURIDICAL CONSCIENCE
Prior to 1982, the Dominion of Canada, following the British
model of constitutional law, did not have a written set of
constitutional rights and freedoms for its citizens, excepting the
Canadian Bill of Rights, which was largely ineffective as it was
not a constitutional document, applied only to federal legislation,
and was read-down by the courts.1 Therefore, Canadians were
left to trust in the democratic process and common law to protect
their rights as citizens in relation to the state. That situation
changed in 1982.
Although various constitutional documents had been under
the control of the government of Canada, the Dominion's
founding document, the British North America Act ("BNA Act"),
being a statute of the United Kingdom, was under the legislative
prevue of the United Kingdom. 2 In 1982, at the request of the
Canadian government, the Parliament of the United Kingdom
renamed the BNA Act the Constitution Act of 18673 and passed
the Canada Act. 4 Attached to the latter was Schedule B, the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms ("Charter"). 5 The
Charter stated, among other things, that all persons had the
right under section 2(a) to "freedom of conscience and religion"
ostensibly only limited by two sections: section 1 where such
limitations were according to law and were "demonstrably
justifiable in a free and democratic society," and section 33, the
notwithstanding clause, which allowed the federal and provincial
legislatures to temporarily suspend fundamental rights and
freedoms and other rights with respect to specific legislation
when articulated therein.6 Although the notwithstanding clause
1 Canadian Bill of Rights, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2 Ch. 44 (U.K.), as reprinted in
R.S.C., ch. 1, § 2 (Appendix 1985) ("Every law of Canada shall, unless it is expressly
declared by an Act of Parliament of Canada that it shall operate notwithstanding
the Canadian Bill of Rights .... ").
2 British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3 (U.K.), as reprinted in
R.S.C., No. 5 (Appendix 1985).
3 Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3 (U.K.).
4 Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.).
5 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.).
6 Id. §§ 1, 2(a), 33(1).
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has been used with respect to some issues-such as language
rights by the Government of the Province of Quebec-it has
never been used with respect to section 2(a): freedom of
conscience and religion.
Within short order, the Supreme Court of Canada was asked
to adjudicate in a matter dealing with freedom of conscience
under section 2(a) of the Charter. In R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.,7
the court heard a matter dealing with store closures and religious
holidays. Chief Justice Dickson delivered the majority decision
and, in doing so, defined the framework of section 2(a), its
conjoint nature, freedom, and the role and significance of
conscience in Canadian society.
He stated that "freedom of conscience and religion" form a
"single integrated concept"8 and that when claimed, such
freedom-in the Berlinian sense of positive and negative
freedom-"embraces both the absence of coercion and constraint,
and the right to manifest beliefs and practices."9 Chief Justice
Dickson also stated that
[f]reedom means that, subject to such limitations as are
necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or
the fundamental rights and freedoms of others, no one is to be
forced to act in a way contrary to his beliefs or his
conscience.... A truly free society is one which can accommodate
a wide variety of beliefs, diversity of tastes and pursuits, customs
and codes of conduct. A free society is one which aims at equality
with respect to the enjoyment of fundamental freedoms .... 10
Lastly, the role of conscience and its significance to Canada as a
free and democratic society was stated:
It is because of the centrality of the rights associated with
freedom of individual conscience both to basic beliefs about
human worth and dignity and to a free and democratic political
system that American jurisprudence has emphasized the
primacy or "firstness" of the First Amendment. It is this same
centrality that in my view underlies their designation in the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as "fundamental."
They are the sine qua non of the political tradition underlying
the Charter.... It should also be noted ... that an emphasis on
individual conscience and individual judgment also lies at the
7 [1985] 18 D.L.R.4th 321.
s Id. at 361.
9 Id. at 354.
10 Id. at 353-54.
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heart of our democratic political tradition. The ability of each
citizen to make free and informed decisions is the absolute
prerequisite for the legitimacy, acceptability, and efficacy of our
system of self-government."
If there was a concern regarding the Chief Justice's comment it
may have been with his characterization that the phrase
"freedom of conscience and religion" was to be read conjointly.
However, later cases from the same court have revised that
understanding and determined that the elements of religion and
conscience may be read conjunctively in certain cases but not
necessarily, as freedom of conscience could stand alone as a
fundamental freedom.
The court was soon to define conscience in juridical terms
and to find freedom of conscience as a derivative right under
section 7 of the Charter. In 1988, in R. v. Morgentaler,12 the
supreme court dealt with the prosecution of a Canadian doctor
who set-up an abortion clinic to perform abortions for women
who had not obtained a certificate from a hospital's therapeutic
abortion committee as required by section 251(4) of the Criminal
Code of Canada. 13 The court said that
[t]he principal issue raised by this appeal [was] whether the
abortion provisions of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34,
infringe the "right to life, liberty and security of the person and
the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with
the principles of fundamental justice" as formulated in s. 7 of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.14
In a split decision, the majority of the supreme court found
in favour of the appellant doctor for one or more of three reasons:
section 251(4) of the Criminal Code breached a woman's right to
"life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice";15 section 251(4) breached the appellant's
11 Id. at 361.
12 [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30.
13 Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 251(4) (1970) (current version at R.S.C.,
ch. C-46, § 287(4) (1985)) ("Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply... if... the
therapeutic abortion committee for that accredited or approved hospital... has by
certificate in writing stated that.., the continuation of the pregnancy of such
female person would or would be likely to endanger her life or health . .
14 Morgentaler, 1 S.C.R. at 45.
15 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 7 (U.K.).
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right to freedom of conscience under 2(a) of the Charter; and
section 251(4) contained rules unnecessary to the protection of
the fetus, which alone was sufficient to rule in favour of the
appellant doctor.16 Mr. Justice Wilson, in the majority, noted
that in depriving a citizen of section 7 rights the state also
deprived her of the right to freedom of conscience. Moreover, he
posited that the application of freedom of conscience applied
more extensively than only to religious beliefs:
The deprivation of the s. 7 right in this case offends freedom of
conscience guaranteed in s. 2(a) of the Charter. The decision
whether or not to terminate a pregnancy is essentially a moral
decision and in a free and democratic society the conscience of
the individual must be paramount to that of the state. Indeed,
s. 2(a) makes it clear that this freedom belongs to each of us
individually. "Freedom of conscience and religion" should be
broadly construed to extend to conscientiously-held beliefs,
whether grounded in religion or in a secular morality and the
terms 'conscience' and 'religion' should not be treated as
tautologous if capable of independent, although related,
meaning. The state here is endorsing one conscientiously-held
view at the expense of another. It is denying freedom of
conscience to some, treating them as means to an end, depriving
them of their "essential humanity."17
The significance of the Big M Drug Mart and Morgentaler
cases are that the Court had defined freedom of conscience not as
the collective right of a community but as an individual right, in
accord with Dworkin's notion of rights,18 in that it was necessary
to ensure a free, liberal democracy. Further, juridically,
conscience was based upon a secular liberal definition of
conscience as "conscientiously-held beliefs." 19
Notwithstanding the above, the Court was not prepared to
give free reign to freedom of conscience within the individual
sphere of action. In Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney
General),20 a terminally-ill patient suffered from an advanced
state of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis and sought to be provided
assistance at a future stage of the illness in order to commit
suicide, as she would be incapable of the act herself. Section
16 Morgentaler, 1 S.C.R. at 38.
17 Id. at 37.
18 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (2005).
19 Morgentaler, 1 S.C.R. at 179.
20 [1993] 107 D.L.R.4th 342.
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241(b) of the Criminal Code of Canada prohibited the giving of
assistance to commit suicide. A majority of the court held that the
section 7 Charter rights of "life, liberty and security of the person"
were to be balanced against the consciously held belief of the
individual and further that the section 7 rights reflected and
represented a value in Canadian society-the sanctity of life.21
On balancing the individual's right to freedom of conscience and
society's value of the sanctity of life and further, as there was no
consensus in Canadian society respecting the acceptance of
assisted suicide, the court concluded that the relevant section of
the Criminal Code was intra vires and denied the appellant
patient her remedy. 22
In dissent, Chief Justice Lamer would have allowed the
patient to take her own life with assistance and stated that
commonly held religious beliefs should not preclude the operation
of an individual's freedom of conscience. He stated:
In my opinion, the Court should answer this question without
reference to the philosophical and theological considerations
fuelling the debate on the morality of suicide or euthanasia. It
should consider the question before it from a legal
perspective.., while keeping in mind that the Charter has
established the essentially secular nature of Canadian society
and the central place of freedom of conscience in the operation
of our institutions.2 3
Yet, it was clear that the majority had considered secular reasons
in its decision as Mr. Justice Sopinka stated: "Aiding or
[counsel]ing a person to commit suicide, on the one hand, and
homicide, on the other, are sometimes extremely closely
related."24 Arguably, the possibility of abuse and the lack of a
political consensus in favour of assisted suicide were the secular
reasons for the court's judgment. That suggested conclusion is
also in concert with Chief Justice Lamer's comment in Rodriguez
where he said that the Canadian Charter "has established the
essentially secular nature of Canadian society and the central
place of freedom of conscience in the operation of our
institutions., 25
21 See id. at 397.
22 See id. at 394.
23 Id. at 366.
24 Id. at 401.
25 Id. at 366.
2008] CATHOLIC SCHOOL FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE 75
The current Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, McLachlin,
arguably appears-in a broad sense-to agree, stating that:
There is no doubt that... government by consent, the
protection of life and personal security, and freedom from
discrimination... can all be advanced by moral argument. It is
worth noting, however, that they can also be supported by a
democratic argument grounded in conceptions of the state and
fundamental human dignity that we have developed since John
Stuart Mill.
... [T]he legitimacy of the modern democratic state arguably
depends on its adhesion to fundamental norms that transcend
the law and executive action. 26
Notwithstanding the above, it is certainly arguable that the
juridical conscience can rest its justification upon religious beliefs
in a liberal, pluralistic, democracy. Taylor notes:
The secular is grounded on common action not religious beliefs
but there is no reason why religious beliefs might not form such
a common action. The key seems to be that one should not
assume that the secular society should exclude the religious in
so far as a liberal democratic pluralistic society is concerned. 27
In other words, conscience is the broader concept under
which conscientiously held religious beliefs would qualify as
requiring freedom not the converse.
Benson offers three definitions of the secular from Canadian
case law which this paper adopts:
1. The state is expressly non-religious and must not support
religion in any way ("neutral" secular);
2. The state does not affirm religious belies of any particular
religious group but may act so as to create conditions
favorable to religions generally ("positive" secular);
3. The state is not competent in matters involving religion
but must not act so as to inhibit religious manifestations
that do not threaten the common good ("negative"
secular). 28
26 Hon. Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Can., Remarks at
the 2005 Lord Cooke Lecture in Wellington, New Zealand: Unwritten Constitutional
Principles: What Is Going On? (Dec. 1, 2005), available at http://www.scc-
csc.gc.ca/aboutcourt/judges/speecheslUnwrittenPrinciples-e.asp.
27 CHARLES TAYLOR, Liberal Politics and the Public Sphere, in PHILOSOPHICAL
ARGUMENTS 257, 269 (1995).
28 Ian T. Benson, Notes Towards a (Re) Definition of the "Secular," 33 U. BRIT.
COLUM. L. REV. 519, 530 (1999-2000).
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The thorny question remained how an adjudicator could
determine the bona fides of a belief when it was not religiously
based. The Federal Court of Canada (Trial Division) dealt with
that question in Maurice v. Canada (Attorney General).29 In
Maurice a prison inmate made application for special
consideration regarding a lacto-vegetarian diet which the prison
officials had refused. He claimed that as other prisoners' special
diets had been granted based upon religious reasons, he too
should have such consideration for reasons of conscience under
section 2(a) of the Charter. 30 His application was successful.
Justice Campbell held that: "[C]ogent evidence must be produced
to prove the conscientious belief to a balance of probabilities. On
the evidence in the present case, I have no difficulty finding that
the Applicant does have a strongly held belief regarding the
consumption of animal products. '31 The "cogent evidence" clearly
referred to not just an articulated belief but also a behavioral
pattern which lent credibility to the individual's actions.
Mention should be made, as Mr. Justice Campbell stated in
Maurice, that under article 18 of the United Nations Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, freedom of conscience is mentioned
and further that Canada is a signatory to that document.
However, such international documents-ratified only by the
executive branch of government-are not law in Canada-
although the Supreme Court has held that they may be
philosophically persuasive. 32
The above cases establish some of the parameters of freedom
of conscience under the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. Juridically, freedom of conscience is a fundamental
right of all persons; it is expressly protected under section 2(a),
but may be derived from section 7;33 it is defined as a belief
conscientiously or strongly held;3 4 it is an individual right not a
29 [2002] 210 D.L.R.4th 186.
30 See id. at 188.
31 Id. at 192.
32 See Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1999] 174
D.L.R.4th 193, 230-31.
33 Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney Gen.), [1993] 107 D.L.R.4th 342, 387
(quoting Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 7 (U.K.)).
34 See R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 18 D.L.R.4th 321; Maurice, 210
D.L.R.4th at 188-91.
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collective right;35 it requires a cogent manifestation and clear
indicia that such a belief is bona fide held by the individual; 36 it
is not based upon a philosophy or theology but arguably it may be
so; 37 its expression must be balanced against the fundamental
rights and values of the Charter;38 and it is warranted as one of
the, if not the, keystones to a free, democratic, pluralistic,
democracy. The above is consistent with the idea that the
Charter's rights and freedoms are interpreted by the courts by
the purposive method, which takes into account the purpose and
rationale of the freedom or right in question within the context of
the Charter as a whole, the Canadian legal and political
tradition, and the changing needs of Canadian society.39
Juridically, freedom of conscience is the sine qua non of a free,
democratic, pluralistic, liberal society.40
It would be remiss not to briefly mention that the term
conscience has been employed in cases which have not been
concerned with freedom of conscience in order to ascertain if
their usage of that term is relevant to this Paper. The conclusion
of this author is that such cases may have some relevance. Some
Canadian cases have spoken of matters that "shock the
conscience." In particular, that, juridical expression has been
used in matters of fundamental justice where the extradition of a
foreign fugitive from Canada to a state wherein the accused
might face extremely harsh treatment is seen as contrary to
Canadian values.41 It thus appears that conscience has, in at
least some cases, perhaps under section 7 of the Charter, a
collective meaning not as a fundamental freedom but rather as
an interpretive principle in relation to the Charter's legal rights.
Moreover, the relevance and importance of conscience has
been cited in Canadian law with regard to the application of the
principles of equity. Therein it can, when there is convergence
35 See Big MDrug Mart, 18 D.L.R.4th at 361.
36 See Maurice, 210 D.L.R.4th at 191.
37 R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 37.
38 Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney Gen.), [1993] 107 D.L.R.4th 342,
395-96.
39 Adler v. Ontario, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609, 665.
40 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, 302.
41 Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3,
22; United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, 321-25; Canada v. Schmidt, [1987] 1
S.C.R. 500, 522; Gwynne v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 103 B.C.A.C. 1, 20-21 (B.C.
Ct. App. 1998).
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with an equitable principle or in the case of unconscionability,
successfully establish a ground for an action: constructive trust,
implied trust, compensation for error in law, and mistake in law
as well as other equitable grounds. 42 In Soulos v. Korkontzilas,
McLachlin cited with approval the statement by McClean
"'[g]ood conscience'.., lies at 'the very foundation of equitable
jurisdiction.' "43 Conscience in equity is a complex area beyond
the scope of this paper; however, upon reading the mentioned
cases, one is left wondering whose conscience the courts are
referring to. Is it the court's conscience, the public's conscience, a
party's conscience, a philosophical definition of conscience, or a
theological definition of conscience? In any event, case law points
to the relevance, perseverance, and significance of the idea of
conscience in Canadian jurisprudence.
In sum, the juridical conscience in Canada is intrinsically
entwined with the concept of freedom and is perceived by the
courts as a keystone for a free, democratic, pluralistic society. It
is secular in nature and relies upon the history, norms, and
values of Canadian society for its content and juridical
interpretation which in turn underpins and legitimizes the
authority of the modern democratic state. Moreover, as a concept
it is present in matters of extradition and equity and is used as a
collective concept for Canadian values acting both as a shield
(negative liberty) and a sword (positive liberty) for the individual.
II. THE CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE
Part II of the Paper looks briefly at past understandings of
conscience in the Catholic Church, relevant documents of Vatican
II, and the writings of Germain Grisez, Bernard Haring, and
Cardinal Ratzinger (as he then was in 1991) with reference to the
idea of conscience.
A. Generally on Conscience
There have been many scholarly works that have been
written on conscience, which encompass the history of the
42 Rathwell v. Rathwell, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 436, 450, 455 (stating that courts
consider good conscience of the applicable parties when examining constructive
trusts); see also Pettkus v Becker [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834, 844, 859 (citing Rathwell).
43 [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217, 232-33 (citing A.J. McClean, Constructive and Resulting
Trusts-Unjust Enrichment in a Common Law Relationship-Pettkus v. Becker, 16
U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 155, 222 (1982)).
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concept from the Greeks;44 through Judaism and biblical
sources;45 to modern times touching upon other views: Catholic,46
Protestant, 47  Orthodox,48  Islam, 49  Buddhism, 50  Hinduism,51
psychology, 52 and biology. 53  Such an historical overview is
obviously beyond this Paper.
Suffice to say that every human being is faced with decisions
which she or he perceives as a choice between right and wrong,
good and bad, or bad and bad. It is also true that the individual
in that position will attempt to exercise some understanding, no
matter how rudimentary, of right and wrong, good and bad, or
bad and worse. Further, once having made the decision, it will
be open to future scrutiny by the individual with respect to its
coherence with the criteria upon which it was chosen.
44 See generally APULEIUS: ON THE GOD OF SOCRATES 8-15, 25-26 (Thomas
Taylor & Laurence Ogilvy trans., Holmes Publishing Group 3d ed. 2001) (1822).
45 See generally Jonathan Gorsky, Conscience in Jewish Tradition, in
CONSCIENCE IN WORLD RELIGIONS 129 (Jayne Hoose ed., 1999) [hereinafter
CONSCIENCE IN WORLD RELIGIONS].
46 See generally PHILIPPE DELHAYE, THE CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE (Charles
Quinn trans., 1968); TIMOTHY C. POTTS, CONSCIENCE IN MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY
(1980); ROBERT J. SMITH, CONSCIENCE AND CATHOLICISM: THE NATURE AND
FUNCTION OF CONSCIENCE IN CONTEMPORARY ROMAN CATHOLIC MORAL THEOLOGY
(1998).
47 See generally Michael Robbins Weed, Conscience in Protestant Ethics: An
Examination of Protestant Views of the Nature and Function of Conscience Focusing
on the Thought of Select Contemporary Theologians (May 8, 1978) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University) (on file with author); Dave Leal, Against
Conscience: A Protestant View, in CONSCIENCE IN WORLD RELIGIONS, supra note 45,
at 21; DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, ETHICS (Eberhard Bethge ed., Neville Horton Smith
trans., 1964) (1949).
48 See generally Stephen Thomas, Conscience in Orthodox Thought, in
CONSCIENCE IN WORLD RELIGIONS, supra note 45, at 99.
49 See generally Ron Geaves, Islam and Conscience, in CONSCIENCE IN WORLD
RELIGIONS, supra note 45, at 155.
5o See generally George D. Chryssides, Buddhism and Conscience, in
CONSCIENCE IN WORLD RELIGIONS, supra note 45, at 176.
51 See generally ARVIND SHARMA, HINDUISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A
CONCEPTUAL APPROACH (2004).
52 See generally SIGMUND FREUD, THE EGO AND THE ID (Joan Riviere trans.,
Norton 1962) (1923); CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); 1 LAWRENCE
KOHLBERG, ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT: THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL
DEVELOPMENT (1981); DAVID W. ROBINSON, CONSCIENCE AND JUNG'S MORAL
VISION: FROM ID TO THOU (2005); Gregory Zilboorg, Superego and Conscience, in
CONSCIENCE: THEOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 210 (C. Ellis Nelson
ed., 1973).
53 See generally A. Bachem, Ethics and Esthetics on a Biological Basis, 25 PHIL.
SCI. 169 (1958); Benedict Carey, Brain Injury Said to Affect Moral Choices, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 22, 2007, at A19.
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This section of the Paper asks, from a Catholic perspective,
from what source does the desire to choose the right or the good
derive, how does one determine the content which allows one to
determine the right from the wrong, and lastly through what
process can one make that determination? Aquinas, Vatican II,
Grisez, Haring, and Ratzinger have provided some guidance with
respect to those questions.
B. Aquinas on Conscience
St. Thomas Aquinas is the touchstone for Roman Catholic
thought on the conception of conscience and so his views will be
briefly reviewed. For Aquinas, the faculty of reason is inherent
to all humans and allows the individual to comprehend the
natural law, which is created and directed by God. Moreover,
reason encompasses not just the intellectual faculty of the mind
but also all other ways of knowing. He posits that by human
nature all people seek the good and avoid the evil as an unerring,
innate condition of being human. This innate condition is called
synderesis and as Aquinas says:
[I]n order that there can be some rightness in human deeds,
there must be some enduring principle which has unchangeable
rightness and by reference to which all deeds are tested, such
that this enduring principle resists everything evil and gives
assent to everything good. This is what synderesis is, whose job
is to murmur back in reply to evil and to turn us towards what
is good. Hence, it is to be admitted that it can not do wrong.54
Having established a basic element in being human as a
tendency towards the good, Aquinas moves on to what he terms
conscience. He considers conscience an act, not a power as
"according to the very nature of the word, [it] implies the relation
of knowledge to something. . . ,,55 It may be in error as it is the
54 St. Thomas Aquinas, Debated Questions on Truth 16-17, in CONSCIENCE IN
MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY 122, 128 (Timoth C. Potts ed., 1980) [hereinafter St. Thomas
Aquinas, Debated Questions]. Author's note: Aquinas's lecture notes, entitled
"Disputed Questions on the Truth," have been translated in part by Potts. That
translation is contained in Potts's book, which is afore referenced. All subsequent
quotations from Aquinas from "Disputed Questions on the Truth" are from Potts's
translation and are referenced to the pages in Potts's book. Potts translated from the
Latin text in S. Thomae Aquinatis, 22 Opera omia, Quaestiones disputatae de
veritate 501-528 (Ad Sanctae Sabinae 1972).
55 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. 1, Q. 79, art. 13, at 408
(Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 1948) (1266-1273) [hereinafter
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE].
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application of the a priori principle of the good known in
synderesis to a particular, contextual situation. Aquinas is clear
that although one must follow one's conscience, merely doing so
will not guarantee the correct choice, but such will ensure that
sin will not be incurred.56 Nevertheless, even in error, he says
"[w]ithout any doubt, conscientia binds."57  He explains this
proposition, saying:
[T]o believe in Christ is good in itself and necessary for
salvation; all the same this does not win the will unless it is
recommended by reason. If the reason presents it as bad, then
the will reaches to it in the light, not that it is really bad in
itself, but because it appears so because of a condition that
happens to be attached by the reason apprehending it. 58
However, willful blindness results in moral culpability as "[i]f,
then, reason or conscience is mistaken through voluntary error,
whether directly or from negligence, then because it is on a
matter a person ought to know about, it does not excuse the will
from evil in following the reason or conscience thus, going
astray."59 The difficulty is that one has no assurance that one's
conscience is unerring when making a moral decision. However,
Aquinas offers certain resources for the conscience to assist in
alleviating that concern: prudence and its accompanying virtues,
the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and connaturality. Those three
resources bridge the gap between the unerring synderesis and
fallible act of conscience.
The assisting virtues of prudence are the ability to take
counsel, sound, or practical judgment according to accepted rules
of conduct and the intelligence to judge exceptional cases outside
of the norm.60 The gifts of the Holy Spirit incorporate wisdom,
knowledge, understanding, counsel, fortitude, piety, and fear,
which corresponded to and assist the fundamental element of
conscience-prudence. Connaturality includes all ways of
knowing beyond the intellectual and as Aquinas says:
[W]isdom denotes a certain rightness of judgment in accord with
divine principles. Now rightness of judgment is twofold: first, in
accord with the complete use of reason, second, on account of a
6 St. Thomas Aquinas, Debated Questions, supra note 54, at 135.
57 Id. at 134.
58 SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 55, pt. I-II, Q. 19, art. 5.
59 Id. pt. I-II, Q. 19, art. 6.
60 Id. pt. I-I, Q. 51, art. 4.
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certain connaturality with the matter about which one has to
judge. Thus, about matters of chastity, a man after inquiring
with his reason forms a right judgment, if he has acquired the
knowledge of ethics, while the one who has the virtue of chastity
judges of such matter by a kind of connaturality. Accordingly, it
belongs to the wisdom that is an intellectual virtue to pronounce
right judgment about divine things after reason has made its
inquiry, but it belongs to wisdom as a gift of the Holy Spirit to
judge aright about them on account of connaturality with
them.6 1
As May states, "connatural knowledge is... a knowledge
resulting from an interaction between sensitivity and affectivity,
intellect and will, knowing and loving. 62
In sum, for Aquinas the inherent and unerring synderesis
acts in conjunction with prudence, which produces the act of
conscience in order to produce a morally inculpable decision.
Honest error does not make that decision culpable.
If, notwithstanding the above, the individual comes to a
conscientious decision that seems in error to others, even the
Catholic Magisterium, then Aquinas says, "anyone upon whom
the ecclesiastical authorities, in ignorance of the true facts,
impose a demand that offends against his clear conscience,
should perish in excommunication rather than violate his
conscience." 63  That statement was grist for the topic of
conscience at Vatican II, the documents of which indicate that
Aquinas's view of conscience has been interpreted, in part, in
different ways.
C. The Documents of Vatican II
The term conscience was frequently referred to in the
documents of Vatican II although its meaning varied upon the
intention of the Church Fathers and at times within the context
of the purpose of the documents.64
61 Id. pt. Il-II, Q. 45, art. 2.
62 W.E. May, Knowledge, Connatural, in 8 NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 205
(Berard L. Marthaler ed., 2d ed. 2003).
63 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, LECTURA ROMANA IN PRIMUM SENTENTIARUM PETRI
LOMBARDI, dist. 38, Q. 2, art. 4 (J.F. Boyle & L.E. Boyle eds., 2006).
64 JAMES HALSTEAD, CONSCIENCE, THE AMERICAN BISHOPS AND THE RENEWAL
OF MORAL THEOLOGY: THE NOTION OF CONSCIENCE IN THE PASTORAL LETTERS OF
THE AMERICAN BISHOPS 110-11 (1986).
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Certainly conscience was on the mind of the Church Fathers,
as in Gaudium et Spes they noted that:
In the depths of his conscience, man detects a law which he
does not impose upon himself, but which holds him to
obedience. Always summoning him to love good and avoid evil,
the voice of conscience when necessary speaks to his heart: do
this, shun that. For man has in his heart a law written by God;
to obey it is the very dignity of man; according to it he will be
judged. Conscience is the most secret core and sanctuary of a
man. There he is alone with God, Whose voice echoes in his
depths. 65
This theme on the "reciprocity of conscience and the inviolable
dignity and freedom of the individual conscience" 66 was also
reflected in the Declaration on Religious Freedom, which stresses
inquiry and dialogue within the community of believers in the
individual's search for truth:
Truth, however, is to be sought after in a manner proper to the
dignity of the human person and his social nature. The inquiry
is to be free, carried on with the aid of teaching or instruction,
communication and dialogue, in the course of which men
explain to one another the truth they have discovered, or think
they have discovered, in order thus to assist one another in the
quest for truth. Moreover, as the truth is discovered, it is by a
personal assent that men are to adhere to it. 67
Again, the Church stresses both the freedom and the binding
nature of the individual's conscience:
On his part, man perceives and acknowledges the imperatives
of the divine law through the mediation of conscience. In all his
activity a man is bound to follow his conscience in order that he
may come to God, the end and purpose of life. It follows that he
is not to be forced to act in manner contrary to his conscience.
Nor, on the other hand, is he to be restrained from acting in
accordance with his conscience, especially in matters religious.
The reason is that the exercise of religion, of its very nature,
consists before all else in those internal, voluntary and free acts
whereby man sets the course of his life directly toward God. No
65 PAUL VI, GAUDIUM ETSPES 16 (1965).
66 Jayne Hoose, Conscience in the Roman Catholic Tradition, in CONSCIENCE IN
WORLD RELIGIONS, supra note 45, at 62, 72.
67 PAUL VI, DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM DIGNITATIS HuMANAE 3
(1965).
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merely human power can either command or prohibit acts of
this kind.68
Yet the Church Fathers went on to say in Article 14 that the
correct formation of the individual conscience is crucial:
[I]n the formation of their consciences, the Christian faithful
ought carefully to attend to the sacred and certain doctrine of
the Church. For the Church is, by the will of Christ, the teacher
of the truth. It is her duty to give utterance to, and
authoritatively to teach, that truth which is Christ Himself, and
also to declare and confirm by her authority those principles of
the moral order which have their origins in human nature
itself.69
As Gleesen notes, one finds in Gaudium et Spes, Article 16-and
one could argue Articles 3 and 14 of Dignitatis Humanae
Personae-that those texts
[i]nvokeD both legalistic and religious understandings of
conscience. It directs our attention both to the objectivity of the
moral law and to the unique and inviolable character of a
person's response to God's call. What the text does not do is
explain how these two realities are to be understood in relation
to each other. 70
Speaking further on conscience, in Lumen Gentium the Fathers
noted in Article 16 that those who are open to synderesis and yet
who do not know the Gospel are not culpable for their lack of
belief. The Fathers said:
Those ... who through no fault of their own do not know the
Gospel of Christ or His Church, yet sincerely seek God and
moved by grace strive by their deeds to do His will as it is
known to them through the dictates of conscience. Nor does
Divine Providence deny the helps necessary for salvation to
those who, without blame on their part, have not yet arrived at
an explicit knowledge of God and with His grace strive to live a
good life. Whatever good or truth is found amongst them is
looked upon by the Church as a preparation for the Gospel. She
knows that it is given by Him who enlightens all men so that
they may finally have life. 71
68 Id,
69 Id. 14.
70 Gerald Gleeson, Conscience and Conversion, AUSTL. EJOURNAL
THEOLOGY, Aug. 2003, http://dlibrary.acu.edu.au/research/theology/ejournalaet-l/
GGleeson.htm.
71 PAUL VI, LUMEN GENTIUM 16 (1964).
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The Fathers further restated Aquinas's position that
listening to conscience develops an abiding moral sense of right
and wrong which becomes habitual and may be known as the
Christian Conscience ("conscientia Christian'), which is then
manifest in certain behaviors-love of neighbor, service projects,
and the like-and forbids others.7 2
It is of significance for the aspect of this Paper on Catholic
education that the Vatican II document Gravissimum
Educationis, should be noted. In that document the Church
Fathers stressed both students' and parents' freedom of
conscience declaring "that children and young people have a right
to be motivated to appraise moral values with a right conscience,
to embrace them with a personal adherence, together with a
deeper knowledge and love of God. a73 It went on to say that it
was this freedom that "contributes in the highest degree to the
protection of freedom of conscience, the rights of parents, as well
as to the betterment of culture itself.... Let them do all they
can to stimulate their students to act for themselves .. .
Another Vatican II document, Apostolicam Actuositatem,
stressed the importance for the individual of not a specific moral
decision, but rather "a general moral outlook"75 and "not as some
bishops wished, the reality of the objective world and the
objective moral order."76
As Halstead correctly points out the documents of Vatican II
do not reduce the apparent ambiguity between the personal duty
in the individual to form her or his own conscience and the
individual's responsibility to listen to the Church, its tradition,
and Magisterium. It is certainly correct to say that "the Council
fathers... were willing to tolerate two different visions of the
moral life."77 Cardinal Ratzinger points to the conundrum when
speaking of the two interpretations:
One is a renewed understanding of the Catholic essence, which
expounds Christian faith from the basis of freedom and as the
very principle of freedom itself. The other is a superseded, 'pre-
conciliar' model, which subjects Christian existence to
72 HALSTEAD, supra note 64, at 114.
73 PAUL VI, GRAVISSIMUM EDuCATIONIS 1 (1965).
74 Id. 8.
75 HALSTEAD, supra note 64, at 119-20.
76 Id. at 120.
77 Id. at 133.
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authority, regulating life even in its most intimate preserves,
and thereby attempts to maintain control over people's lives.
Morality of conscience and morality of authority, as two
opposing models, appear to be locked in struggle with each
other. Accordingly, the freedom of the Christian would be
rescued by appeal to the classical principle of moral tradition:
that conscience is the highest norm that man is to follow, even
in opposition to authority. Authority-in this case, the
[M]agisterium-may well speak of matters moral, but only in
the sense of presenting conscience with material for its own
deliberation. Conscience would retain, however, the final word.
Some authors reduce conscience in this, its aspect of final
arbiter to the formula conscience is infallible .... But .... if
this were the case, it would mean that there is no truth-at
least not in moral or religious matters, which is to say, in the
areas that constitute the very pillars of our existence. 78
Further attempts by the Church were made to clarify the
issues, and perhaps to resolve at least one problem. Veritatis
Spendor dealt with the difficulty with proportionalism, which
states that "whether there are some kinds of action (such as the
use of contraception) which are 'always wrong,' no matter what
the circumstances or intentions of the people ... involved,"' 79 but
the tension remained between the two quite different
interpretations of conscience both claiming the Aquinas'
inheritance. In particular, one author saw Veritatis Spendor as
attempting to reinforce the Magisterium's primacy.8 0
The documents of Vatican II state that the Catholic Church's
position is that there is an objective moral truth based upon
natural law provided by God, which can provide guidance to
human action. That truth is known through reason, the tradition
of the Church, and the Magisterium, which is guided by the Holy
Spirit. The individual desires (synderesis) to seek the truth in
moral deliberations by applying reason and prudence, with its
various assistants, to the contextualized situation within which
the moral decision is to be made. The individual conscience may
78 JOSEPH RATZINGER, Conscience and Truth [hereinafter RATZINGER,
Conscience and Truth], in ON CONSCIENCE: Two ESSAYS 11, 11-12 (2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted) [hereinafter ON CONSCIENCE].
79 Gleeson, supra note 70.
80 See Nicholas Peter Harvey, Comment on Veritatis Splendor, 7 STUD.
CHRISTIAN ETHICS 14, 14 (1994).
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err and not be morally culpable but she or he must have applied
prudence both to the content and decision-making process.
Nevertheless, the issue of authority versus autonomy and
freedom remains a question on the Catholic Church's
understanding of conscience. Fundamentally, the difficulty was
with what Smith calls the revisionist and neo-revisionist
approaches to conscience. It is to a brief overview of those two
positions that this Paper now turns.
D. The Revisionist and Neo-Revisionist Approaches
Two Catholic writers, Germain Grisez and Bernard Haring,
each represent a differing view of conscience, both claiming the
Aquinas inheritance.
1. The Man-in-Relation-to-Law Model (Germain Grisez)
Grisez's non-revisionism has been called the "man-in-
relation-to-law" approach.81 Grisez begins with the notion that
no action has moral praise or culpability in terms of the
individual, unless it is freely chosen. It is the radical freedom of
the autonomous individual to freely choose which makes the
actor's action, in terms of the actor, moral or immoral. Indeed,
for Grisez, conscience is "an awareness of mortal truth."8 2 He
suggests that the colloquial understanding of conscience is in
three parts, which is consistent with Aquinas' understanding: an
awareness of moral principles, the analysis of a particular
situation based upon those principles, and the action or inaction
taken. Further, he is in agreement with Aquinas that conscience
must be followed, but suggests that the Magisterium of the
Catholic Church has bridged the gap between the mortal
principles written on the soul by natural law and their
application in the contextually created lives of individuals.
Hence, the individual conscience should follow all particulars of
action and inaction as delineated by the Magisterium.
Connaturality has its place if a person is mature and prudent,
which in turn will bring that person to accept the teachings of the
81 ROBERT J. SMITH, CONSCIENCE AND CATHOLICISM: THE NATURE AND
FUNCTION OF CONSCIENCE IN CONTEMPORARY ROMAN CATHOLIC MORAL THEOLOGY
45 (1998).
82 1 GERMAIN GRISEZ, THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS: CHRISTIAN MORAL
PRINCIPLES 76 (1983).
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Magisterium teachings.8 3 As the Catholic Church is guided by
the Holy Spirit, the "faithful and clearheaded Catholic
[has] ... no right to follow a judgment of conscience against the
teaching of the [M]agisterium."8 4
2. The "Restless-Heart-Toward-God" Model (Bernard Hdring)
Hdring's revisionism has been called the "Restless-Heart-
Toward-God" model.8 5 His moral framework is complex and goes
well beyond this Paper, but the major elements of his view of
conscience should be mentioned. For Haring, the human
conscience appears to be an innate human capacity, which is
oriented towards the good and is driven by its freedom to search
for the truth of that good within relationships-indeed, within
community-while employing prudence in actions within
particular circumstances. The importance of the community is
that "man's conscience is unthinkable without an active sharing
of experiences and insights with others searching for truth in
mutual responsibility."8 6  It is prudence, which is developed
through a relationship with God, that provides a clear view of
that which is the instant case facing the person and which
suggests the correct course of action. He states: "The virtue of
prudence can flourish only in the soil of sound conscience. 87 For
Hiring, conscience is "the inner core, the deepest wellspring of
integration and wholeness."8
His view is that the "mere inculcation of various doctrines,
without a synthesis in Christ and without a sharing of the faith,
does nothing to help the formation of a distinctly Christian
conscience [and] can become an obstacle to an integrated faith. '8 9
He goes on to say that "it staggers the imagination to think that
an earthly authority or an ecclesiastical Magisterium could take
away from man his own decision of conscience."90
83 See id. at 566.
84 Germain Grisez, The Duty and Right to Follow One's Judgment of Conscience,
56 LINACRE Q. 13, 17 (1989).
85 SMITH, supra note 81, at 73.
86 BERNARD HARING, A THEOLOGY OF PROTEST 69 (1970).
87 1 BERNARD HARING, THE LAW OF CHRIST: MORAL THEOLOGY FOR PRIESTS
AND LAITY 510 (E.G. Kaiser trans., Newman Press 1963) (1954).
88 1 BERNARD HARING, FREE AND FAITHFUL IN CHRIST: MORAL THEOLOGY FOR
CLERGY AND LAITY 259 (1978).
89 Id.
90 BERNARD HARING, THE CHRISTIAN EXISTENTIALIST: THE PHILOSOPHY AND
THEOLOGY OF SELF-FULFILLMENT IN MODERN SOCIETY 63 (1968).
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Although Haring appreciates the significance of the
Magisterium, he takes the position that the Church has long
sought obedience before conscience and that "in the face of such
authority.., a considerable distrust of any. command is an
obligation in conscience." 91
3. Pope Benedict XVI
Cardinal Ratzinger, as earlier stated, weighed into the
discussion saying that the "[m]orality of conscience and morality
of authority, as two opposing models, appear to be locked in
struggle with each other."92 His concern seems to be that a "firm,
subjective conviction and the lack of doubts ... do not justify
man [in that] the Pharisee no longer knows that he too has guilt.
He has a completely clear conscience .... Their consciences no
longer accuse them but justify them."93
His understanding is that:
Two standards become apparent for ascertaining the presence of
a real voice of conscience. First, conscience is not identical to
personal wishes and taste. Second, conscience cannot be
reduced to social advantage, to group consensus, or to the
demands of political and social power. 94 Historically considered,
morality does not 'belong to the area of subjectivity, but is
guaranteed by the community and has a reference to the
community. 95
Ratzinger seems to answer the question of the conscience in
apparent conflict with the Magisterium by conflating the two
through the concept of truth. That is, neither conscience nor the
teachings of the Church are, in conflict with the truth. The
former looks to remembrance "not only of the moral law written
on our hearts but also to a teaching on conscience that is true to
our deepest traditions and to our own humanity. '96
It appears that Ratzinger offers that synderesis directs one
towards the truth, and that prudence and its associates orient
one towards the truth, which involves the freedom to search
within the tradition of the faith and the faith community in
91 BERNARD HARING, CHRISTIAN MATURITY 60 (Arlene Swidler trans., 1967).
92 RATZINGER, Truth and Conscience, supra note 78, at 12.
93 Id. at 17, 19.
94 Id. at 26.
95 JOSEPH RATZINGER, Bishops, Theologians, and Morality, in ON CONSCIENCE,
supra note 78, at 43, 53.
96 John Haas, Foreword to ON CONSCIENCE, supra note 78, at 1, 10.
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dialogue with a mature, respectful, serious, and hence bona fide
consideration of the teachings of the Magisterium. Once the
search is complete the individual's conscience must act in accord
with its own understanding, whatever the cost. That cost may be
high and will not necessarily bring the conscience into conflict
with the Magisterium but when that is so,
one's own conscience.., must be obeyed before all else, if
necessary even against the requirement of ecclesiastical
authority. This emphasis on the individual, whose conscience
confronts him with a supreme and ultimate tribunal, [is] one
which in the last resort is beyond the claim of external social
groups, even of the official Church. 97
Cardinal Ratzinger's position is in accord with that of
Cardinal Newman who, when in a letter to the Duke of Norfolk,
wrote: "If I am obliged to bring religion into after-dinner toasts
(which indeed does not seem to be quite right) I shall drink to the
Pope, if you please-still, to conscience first, and to the Pope
afterwards."98
In conclusion, although there appears to be a conflict within
the Catholic idea of conscience between authority and autonomy,
that dichotomy may be an error. What appears to be at issue is
neither the conscience as action, nor the specific content upon
which that action is based, but rather the importance of prudence
and its associates in the selection of the contents of one's
conscience and the mature reflective process through which the
individual arrives at a consciously held decision.
III. CATHOLIC SCHOOLS AND FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE
Part III summarizes the juridical and current Catholic views
of freedom of conscience and describes the difficulties that
Catholic school administrators face in applying a Catholic
definition of conscience within Catholic schools.
A. The Juridical Concept
The juridical concept of freedom of conscience in the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms offers a view founded
97 Joseph Ratzinger, The Dignity of the Human Person, in 5 COMMENTARY ON
THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II, 115, 134 (Herbert Vorgrimler ed., W.J. O'Hara
trans., 1969).
98 RATZINGER, Conscience and Truth, supra note 78, at 23.
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upon a free, democratic, pluralistic, and liberal society, which
requires its citizens to make their own choices about
fundamental matters involving how they wish to live their lives
within that society. The State is committed to the protection of
citizens' consciences from the tyranny of the majority, if the
beliefs that underlie those choices are "conscientiously-held
beliefs" and do not, in their expression, deleteriously affect
others.
Moreover, freedom of conscience may also be derived, in part,
from the legal right to liberty and security of the person under
section 7 of the Charter. The individual's conscience is thus
viewed externally by the State as the necessary motor for
individual choice, not to be restricted by the State except in
balancing others' rights (under section 1) or in temporary
suspension (under section 33).99
B. The Sacred Concept
The Catholic Church's view of conscience as articulated in
the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas and the documents of
Vatican II can be interpreted as incorporating two models: '"Man
in Relation to Law" and "Restless-Heart-Toward-God".10 0 The
distinction between the models is the extent of the authoritative
role of the Magisterium not only in the formation of the
individual's antecedent conscience, but also in the culpability of
the consequential conscience.
C. Freedom of Conscience and Catholic Schools: The Legal Issue
In Canada, there are three provinces that have
constitutionally protected Catholic schools, which receive funding
from those provinces: Ontario, Alberta, and Saskatchewan. The
rights and privileges of Catholic schools in those provinces, which
were acknowledged in law prior to each province entering
confederation, are constitutionally entrenched and may only be
abrogated through a constitutional process. 101 Further, those
rights and privileges may not be deleteriously affected by the
rights and freedoms within the Canadian Charter of Rights and
99 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
100 See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
10 Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3, § 93 (U.K.), as reprinted in
R.S.C., No. 5 (Appendix 1985). See generally Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.)
(granting the Constitution Act "the force of law in Canada").
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Freedoms as section 29 of the Charter states "[niothing in this
Charter abrogates or derogates from any rights or privileges
guaranteed by or under the Constitution of Canada in respect of
denominational, separate or dissentient schools." 10 2 This section
of the Charter refers to legal rights that existed prior to the
geographical area becoming a province. Therefore, the right of
Catholic schools to demand remediation or to
seek dismissal of non-conformists is arguably constitutionally
entrenched within the Dominion's constitution.
The legal difficulty arises when a non-conformist student or
teacher claims the "Restless-Heart-Toward-God" justification
for such non-conformity. In the past, Catholic schools have
sought successfully to dismiss teachers for non-conformity.
In particular, Catholic teachers who married only in civil
ceremonies were dismissed; 10 3 a Catholic teacher who married a
non-Catholic, whose divorced marriage had not been annulled
was dismissed; 10 4 and an unmarried Catholic teacher who
became pregnant was dismissed for non-conformist behaviour. 10 5
Moreover, even in non-constitutionally protected Catholic schools
in provinces and territories not mentioned above, the Catholic
school board has the right to demand denominational conformity
and to monitor conformity on a continuous basis.106
Given, however, the two interpretations of conscience within
the Catholic Church-a non-conformist, for some acts of non-
conformity that are not contrary to the Church's dogma-may
claim not only the Church's guaranteed freedom of conscience,
but also that the consciencious choice-which albeit is not in
accord with the teachings of the Magisterium-is nevertheless a
choice that does not exclude them from the Church. Hence,
remediation of the non-conformity is not appropriate as a
demand from school administration, nor is dismissal based upon
a warranted denominational cause. Arguably, it is not open to
Catholic school administrators to say that their decision is
defensible by the fact that a majority of the school's Catholic
parents do not accept the non-conformity as the religious aspects
102 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 29 (U.K.).
103 See Essex Roman Catholic Separate Sch. Bd. v. Porter, [1977] 16 O.R.2d 433
(Ont. Div. Ct.).
104 See Caldwell v. Stuart, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 603.
105 See Casagrande v. Hinton, [1987] 51 Alta. L.R.2d 349 (Alta. Ct. Q.B.).
106 Caldwell v. Stuart, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 603.
2008] CATHOLIC SCHOOL FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE 93
of the Catholic school fall under the aegis of the Church 10 7 and its
definition of freedom and conscience. According to this
argument, what is at issue is the individual's exercise of her or
his freedom of conscience not the perception of the majority of the
laity within a school community.
If the above analysis is correct, then a Catholic school
administrator's decision to demand remediation or to dismiss a
non-conformist is not denominationally based, and therefore
must be founded in civil law. Such a conclusion means that the
decision is not constitutionally protected from scrutiny, and that
the Charter rights of the non-conformist are in full force. As the
Charter is interpreted using the purposeful method and on a
secular basis, non-conformity to a religious creed is not an
operative claim, nor can it be claimed to be so by the Catholic
Church's own definition of freedom and conscience. Although
there are some common law precedents in labor law that provide
for the remediation of employees' behaviors, which draw the
employer's business reputation into disrepute and deleteriously
affect the business, such do not stand against a constitutional
(Charter) right, which applies to organs of the state such as the
institution of education. Moreover, section 1 of the Charter is not
arguable by the school employer as by the Catholic Church's own
definition, students and others have freedom of conscience that
may be expressed in the "Restless-Heart-Toward-God" model. An
example of such a conundrum has been provided by the recent
case of Marc Hall, a gay Catholic high school student who sought
to attend his Catholic school's grade twelve prom with his
boyfriend. 08 The Catholic school board objected on the basis,
amongst other things, that to allow such attendance would
condone the gay lifestyle. The local Catholic Bishop testified in
court that if permission were granted to Mr. Hall it would
represent "clear and positive approval not just of the boy's
'orientation' but of his adopting a homosexual lifestyle.' 10 9
Hall successfully sought injunctory relief. Mr. Justice
MacKinnon stated that "[t]here is no evidence of a single position
within the Catholic faith community about what constitutes the
107 CODEX IURIS CANONICI ch. 803-04 (Canon Law Soc'y of Am. trans., 1983)
(1917).
108 See Hall (Litig. Guardian) v. Powers, [2002] 213 D.L.R.4th 308.
109 Id. at 320.
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most appropriate pastoral response to [homosexuality]." He went
on to state, however:
It is not the task of a civil court to direct the Principal, the
Board, the Roman Catholic Church or its members, or indeed
any member of the public as to what his or her religious beliefs
ought to be. The separation of church and state is a
fundamental principle of our Canadian democracy and our
constitutional law.110
It has been argued elsewhere that the Hall decision was
wrongly decided on the grounds that the court misconstrued the
teachings of the Catholic Church as being necessarily
majoritarian in order to be authoritative."' If Hall had claimed
that the expression of his sexual orientation was a choice made in
good conscience in accord with the "Restless-Heart-Toward-God"
model, however, he would ostensibly have had a legally
unassailable argument. His action, although non-conformist in
expression, was within the ambit of denominationally protected
freedom of conscience in the Catholic Church.
Traditionally, one might argue that, because the local Bishop
gave evidence against Hall's request, a voice of the Magisterium
had determined in favor of the school district. Indeed, a local
bishop does have authority over Catholic education to ensure "the
authentic Christian character of the Catholic school"" 2 but he
does not necessarily always speak as the authoritative voice of
the Catholic Church. A local bishop speaks with authority on an
issue as a result of, and when in concurrence with, the contents
of the official Church documents. 113 As Feuerherd states, "Under
this 1998 papal apostolic letter, bishops' conference statements
that seek to bind the faithful must be approved unanimously, or,
with a two-thirds vote, submitted to Rome for approval."" 4
Moreover, although the Code of Canon Law speaks of children
and young persons that are to be cared for so they may achieve
110 Id.
111 See J. Kent Donlevy, Re-Visiting Denominational Cause and Denominational
Breach in Canada's Constitutionally Protected Catholic Schools, J. EDUC. & L. 15(3)
(2005).
112 GABRIEL-MARIE CARDINAL GARRONE, THE SACRED CONGREGATION FOR
CATHOLIC EDUCATION, THE CATHOLIC SCHOOL 73 (1977).
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freedom, that does not discount the warrant for non-conformity,
which is within the "Restless-Heart-Toward-God" model.
Although many in the Catholic Church might disagree with a
non-conformist, the Catechism of the Catholic Church provides
that "[a] human being must always obey the certain judgment of
his conscience."'1 15
If that is correct, then the question becomes: Are the actions
of students and teachers who act in accord with their conscience
yet contrary to the normally espoused values of Catholic schools
subject to administrative remediation and or dismissal? The
answer may arguably be no. Why?
The Catholic school is bound to protect the individual's
freedom of conscience in terms of religion and the "Restless-
Heart-Toward-God" model provides for a reasonable basis for the
non-conformist's action. By the Church's definition, the non-
conformist teacher or student acts within the terms of the
denomination and not in conflict with it. Hence the
administrative demand for remediation must be based on civil
law. That is problematic, because once outside of the area of
constitutional protection for administrative action, it is arguable
that the student or teacher's section 2(a) right and all other
Charter and civil rights are fully operative in defending non-
conformist actions.
CONCLUSION
This conference Paper provides a summary of the relevant
Canadian case law dealing with freedom of conscience under
section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as
well as a brief summary of the two major schools of thought
regarding conscience in the Catholic Church.
In the former case, the argument was made that, although
section 2(a) was secular in a juridical sense, the operation of
section 29 of the Charter and section 93 of the 1867 Constitution
Act provided for a sacred or religious definition of conscience to
be read into those constitutional documents. However, it was
further argued that by operation of the two interpretations of the
Catholic Church's definition of conscience, the Catholic school
administrator may not claim such a constitutional shield for the
remediation and/or dismissal of non-conformist teachers or
115 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 1790 (2d ed. 1997).
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students. If that is the case, the ordinary public law applies,
which provides the non-conformist with a defense utilizing
section 2(a) freedom of conscience in a secular sense under the
Charter.
